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Abstract—Distributed securities exchanges may become de
facto fragmented if they span geographical regions with asymmet-
ric computer infrastructure. First, we build an economic model
of a decentralized exchange with two miner clusters, standing
in for compact areas of economic activity (e.g., cities). “Local”
miners in the area with relatively higher trading activity only join
a decentralized exchange if they enjoy a large speed advantage
over “long-distance” competitors. This is due to a transfer of
economic value across miners, specifically from high- to low-
activity clusters. Second, we estimate the speed advantage of
“local” over “long-distance” miners in a series of Monte Carlo
experiments over a two-cluster, unstructured peer-to-peer net-
work simulated in C. We find that the speed advantage increases
in the level of infrastructure asymmetry between clusters. Cross-
region DEX blockchains are feasible as long as the asymmetry
levels in trading activity and infrastructure availability across
regions are positively correlated.
Index Terms—distributed exchange, fragmentation, P2P net-
work, Monte Carlo simulation, financial markets
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s fragmented equity markets, the same security can
be traded simultaneously on multiple exchanges. For example,
in the United States, no fewer than 13 trading venues compete
to offer trading services [1].
At a first glance, trading fragmentation is socially sub-
optimal [2]. Exchanges are natural monopolies: traders nat-
urally gravitate towards “thick” marketplaces to improve their
chances of finding a counterparty. On the one hand, buyers and
sellers are more likely to be matched if they submit orders to
the same exchange. On the other hand, a monopolist exchange
can charge high fees and commissions, potentially distorting
incentives to trade.
The emergence of electronic trading opened the opportunity
for low-cost market fragmentation. Trading algorithms can
(quasi-) simultaneously monitor available prices on multiple
exchanges and automatically choose the best one within mil-
liseconds. As a result, technology eroded the natural monopoly
position of exchanges. Spurred on by the shift in the technol-
ogy frontier, two regulatory reforms, RegNMS in the United
States (2005) and Mifid in Europe (2007) directly mandated
competition between platforms, setting the stage for today’s
fragmented trading environment.
In theory, distributed exchanges (DEX) as proposed in [3]
or [4] can achieve the best of both worlds: a centralized
marketplace where the infrastructure provider lacks monopoly
power. In a DEX, computers supply trading infrastructure com-
petitively by “mining” orders on a distributed ledger, e.g., a
Blockchain. We refer to such computers as miners throughout
the rest of the paper. In contrast to a traditional exchange
which can unilaterally set trading fees, miners strategically
interact with each other: That is, charging a lower fee allows
a miner to steer order flow away from competitors. At the same
time, if miners post orders to a unique order book within a
distributed smart contract, a centralized market-place emerges
where all buyers and all sellers participate to the same network.
This papers’ contribution is to examine whether such a
centralized, competitive marketplace can emerge in a dis-
tributed exchange setting. Section II builds a simple economic
model. We show that if trading interest is unevenly distributed
across regions, a single DEX implies a transfer of economic
value from high-volume to low-volume regions. A single DEX
emerges only if local miners have a large enough processing
speed advantage over long-distance miners, relative to any
economies of scope from managing a unique blockchain rather
than multiple fragmented ones. Further, miners’ incentives to
become faster act as a centripetal force generating fragmenta-
tion of distributed exchanges: If miners use more computing
power to be locally faster, the network latency between regions
becomes relatively more important.
Having established that the “local” miners’ speed advantage
is a key factor for their incentives to set up a DEX, we calibrate
the parameter in Section III. To this end, we set up Monte
Carlo simulation experiments over an unstructured, two clus-
ter, peer-to-peer network. Further, we analize the sensitivity of
local miners’ speed advantage to factors such as the distance
between regions and the size asymmetry between clusters.
We find that local miners’ advantage is higher if regions are
farther apart geographically and if computer clusters are of
very different sizes.
Several papers study distributed exchanges, and blockchain
financial markets, from an academic perspective. Closest to our
setting, [5] argue that introducing a DEX could reduce the cost
of idle trading infrastructure by generating a real-time price
for trading speed. Using blockchain data, [6] document that
traders on decentralized exchanges engage in bidding wars
on fees to obtain time priority. To prevent front-running on
decentralized exchanges, [7] proposes an encryption algorithm
for orders themselves. [8] build a game-theoretical model to
examine the strategic interaction between miners and traders.
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There is an extensive literature in financial economics on
the impact of market fragmentation. Studying U.S. markets,
[9] find that fragmentation is associated with higher price
volatility and greater market efficiency. The existence of
multiple time-priority order queues enables queue-jumping by
impatient traders, leading to an increase in overall market
depth [10]. On the other hand, fragmentation can lead to
market instability, especially in an environment dominated by
algorithmic trading [11].
II. A SIMPLE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
We build a simple economic framework to model the
miners’ problem as a function of messaging speed over the
Blockchain network.
Consider a two-period economy where miners and traders
are clustered in two geographical areas, A (large) and B
(small). We interpret the areas as two large cities or metropoli-
tan areas (e.g., akin to trading between New York an Chicago).
Each area hosts N ≥ 2 miners, such that the trading infras-
tructure is symmetric. There is a unit mass of traders across
clusters, not necessarily evenly distributed. Without loss of
generality, a fraction β ∈ [ 12 , 1] of traders are located in area
A and 1− β in area B respectively.
We assume that miners receive an exogenous fee f ≥ 0
for each order they are the first to process. Further, miners
are able to process “local” transactions (i.e., same-city trades)
faster than “long-distance” transaction. Particularly, processing
times for local and long-distance transactions are exponentially
distributed with rate λ and piλ, respectively, where pi ≤ 1.
From the properties of a Poisson process, it follows that the
probability of a miner being first to process a local transaction
(competing against both local and long-distance miners) is
P (win local trade) =
λ
Nλ+Npiλ
=
1
N (1 + pi)
. (1)
Conversely, the probability of a miner to first process a long-
distance transaction fee is
P (win long-distance trade) =
pi
N (1 + pi)
. (2)
A. Miner profits and local speed advantage
The expected profit of a miner in area A is
EProfitA =
[
β
1
N (1 + pi)
+ (1− β) pi
N (1 + pi)
]
f. (3)
At the same time, the expected profit of a miner in area B is
EProfitB =
[
β
pi
N (1 + pi)
+ (1− β) 1
N (1 + pi)
]
f. (4)
Proposition 1. In a single-blockchain setup, miners in the
large region A outearn miners in the small region B if
(a) traders tend to cluster in region A (if β > 12 ), and
(b) local mining is more efficient than long-distance mining,
that is pi < 1.
Proof. We compute the difference between (3) and (4),
EProfitA − EProfitB = (1− pi) (2β − 1)
N (1 + pi)
f ≥ 0, (5)
as long as β ≥ 12 and pi ≤ 1.
It turns out that profit asymmetry between miners in dif-
ferent regions is driven by both ex ante skewness in traders’
geographical distribution and by the speed advantage of local
over long-distance miners.
We benchmark the outcome against a fragmented
blockchain setup. With fragmentation, miners have exclusive
access to local traders. Therefore, profits in each area are
proportional to the mass of traders, β and 1− β:
EProfitfragmentedA =
β
N
f and (6)
EProfitfragmentedB =
1− β
N
f. (7)
Comparing equations (3), (4), and (6), we conclude that
a single blockchain always benefits miners in small areas
and harms miners in large areas. In other words, there is
a symmetric value transfer from regions with high trading
volume to regions with little trading activity.
The key variable driving the magnitude of the transfer is the
speed ratio between long-distance and local miners. If local
miners have a large comparative advantage (pi ↘ 0), markets
are de facto fragmented with each set of miners processing
local transactions only. Conversely, if local miners have little
comparative advantage (pi ↗ 1), markets are consolidated and
miners in both areas earn the same expected profit.
An important corollary is that a single blockchain dampens
the effects of any initial asymmetry in regions’ trading interest,
inasmuch as miners have a positive probability of capturing
long-distance trades.
B. Endogenous adoption
We introduce a cost for maintaining a blockchain, C (x) ≥ 0
– where x is the DEX trading volume. The cost function
has the property that C (ax) < aC (x): That is, it is more
expensive to maintain two small DEX blockchains than a
single DEX with double the transaction volume. Moving from
a fragmented DEX to a single DEX generates cost savings for
each miner, since
Cost savings (∆) =
C (x)
N
− C (2x)
2N
≥ 0. (8)
Since moving from an unique to a fragmented DEX implies
a zero-sum transfer between miner groups, a single DEX is
socially optimal as it entails half the fixed cost of a fragmented
exchange.
Will a single blockchain be adopted in equilibrium? Our
results suggest that miners in low-volume areas always prefer
a unique blockchain to a fragmented market: both due to the
positive rent transfer, and the cost savings. For miners in large-
volume areas, a single blockchain is optimal if and only if the
cost savings are large enough, or
EProfitfragmentedA − EProfitA < ∆ =⇒ (9)
pi (2β − 1)
N (1 + pi)
< ∆. (10)
Corollary 1. A-area miners only adopt a single blockchain
if they have a strong local-to-long-distance speed advantage,
that is for pi ≤ p¯i where
p¯i ≡ N∆
(2β − 1)−N∆ . (11)
Figure 1 illustrates the miners’ profits as a function of
relative speed, in both single-blockchain and fragmented-
blockchain market setups.
Fig. 1: Miner profits and market structure
Parameter values: β = 0.75, N = 4, and f = 1.
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Finally, investments in speed can increase fragmentation
by boosting the local-trade advantage. Miners have private
incentives to increase λ and increase their likelihood to capture
order flow. If the difference between the expected local trade
processing time (
1
λ
) and the expected long-distance processing
time (
1
piλ
) is due to a fixed network latency θ, we can compute
pi (a speed ratio) as a function of network latency θ as follows:
1
λ
+ θ =
1
piλ
⇒ pi = 1
1 + θλ
. (12)
From equation (12), pi decreases in θ: if miners in both
areas become faster at the same time, the network latency
is relatively more important, leading to de facto market frag-
mentation.
Section III focuses on estimating pi as a function of the dis-
tance between areas and the asymmetry between the number
of nodes in each cluster.
III. MONTE CARLO NETWORK EXPERIMENT
A. CPU considerations and network topology
Transactions on distributed exchanges (seen as a peer-to-
peer computer network) are registered in a distributed database
(Blockchain) as in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Blockchain update algorithm
(1) set of transactions, hash of previous block, other information (e.g. nonce)
(2) this block may be a very time consuming (e.g for classical proof of
work) (3) a specific consensus algorithm is used and several rounds of
messages are interchanged between all invited nodes
Consensus on the distributed exchange is obtained by
solving a cryptography (i.e., hashing) problem verified by a
quorum with N nodes, where N is sufficiently large. All
nodes in the quorum must communicate with each other, to
prevent attacks from malicious nodes – that is, to provide fault
tolerance. The time to consensus has two components: the
CPU computing time and the speed at which the messages are
transferred to the network. The number of messages required
depends on the specific consensus algorithm (e.g., 2N2 in
practical byzantine fault tolerance algorithm or kN logkN in
scalable dynamic multi-agent practical byzantine fault toler-
ance where the nodes communicates in groups of k nodes
[12]).
To reach consensus, all nodes must communicate over
several rounds to cross-verify information from other nodes.
The consensus is consequently achieved by a qualified, rather
than simple, majority of nodes. That is, if we assume the
network has f faulty or malicious nodes which provide wrong
information, such that N = 3f + 1, consensus emerges when
a minimum of 2f + 1 > 0.5N nodes validate the transaction.
The verification and consensus achievement protocol, is
illustrated in Figure 3, has the following steps:
1) Node i (the trader) want to validate a transaction. He
sends an INVITATION message to a set of nodes J =
{j | j can participate to consensus}.
2) Invited nodes j ∈ J reply with an ACKNOWLEDGE
message and then receive the transaction information for
hash verification.
3) Each node j submits a TRANSACTION OK message
when the hash verification in complete.
4) A number of messages in several rounds will be ex-
changed between all nodes (accordingly with a specific
consensus algorithm). When the consensus algorithm is
complete the transaction is validated and the blockchain
is updated for all nodes.
Fig. 3: Transaction verification and consensus achievement
protocol
Node i initiates a transaction verification and node j participates to consensus
achievement. The messages exchanged between all nodes to achieve consensus
are not shown. Nodes i and j may be in area A or area B.
The performance of whole system is given by its two
components: the processor (i.e., the CPU computing power)
and the network (i.e., its topology and the message delay
between nodes). We turn next to each of the two components.
Let τk denote the random network delay of one such
message, and ξi denote the random processing time for miner
i to implement a general consensus algorithm (e.g., proof-of-
work, proof-of-stake). The total processing time for miner i
in region k can be written as the sum of random variables:
Ti,k =
1
2
τi,k + ξi +
1
2
τi,k = ξi + τi,k. (13)
The first miner to complete the algorithm, denoted by i(1), is
the one to enter the transaction into the blockchain and collect
the fee. Any other node will abort the process.
In reality, both τ and ξ are random variables. The random-
ness in the round-trip time τ is driven by parameters such
as the distance between nodes, asymmetry between clusters,
or message length, whereas randomness in ξ emerges from
the characteristics of the consensus algorithm. Throughout
the rest of the paper, we consider ξ is fixed and disregard
variation in processing times. The assumption is motivated by
our focus on the impact of geographical distance on miner
profits. In particular, the implementation of the consensus
algorithm does not depend on the distance from the trader
node. Further, competitive pressure generates incentives for
each miner to use the best CPU available on the market, which
translates into very similar computing times across miners
(that is, Eξi ≈ Eξj ,∀i 6= j). Table I illustrates, as of October
2019, the highest-performance CPUs available on the retail
market [13]–[17], sorted by their average benchmark score.
TABLE I: CPU performance
CPU Launch date Score range Average Score
Intel Core i9-9900KF Q1 2019 80-110 101
AMD Ryzen 7 3800X Q3 2019 87-100 95.9
Intel Core i7-9800X Q4 2018 79-101 89.9
AMD Ryzen 5 3600 Q3 2019 76-95 88.6
Intel Core i5-9500 Q2 2019 80-92 87.6
Further, the network topology features two node clusters, A
and B, standing in for two different geographies (e.g., cities
where trading activity concentrates). We allow the clusters to
have a different number of nodes, to model asymmetry as in
Section II. Within each cluster, or area, nodes are connected
by high speed links (low delay). Between clusters, nodes are
connected by low speed links (high delay). That is, the distance
between areas A and B is modeled through a larger messaging
delay.
Fig. 4: Network model
Nodes are fully interconnected (not all the link are illustrated). Only nodes
A0–A3 and B0–B2 participate to achieve consensus. Node A0 or node B0
will initiate transaction verification.
Figure 4 illustrates such a network topology. The node
initiating the transaction (and collecting the fee) can be located
either in area A or in area B – without loss of generality, we
label it as A0 or B0. The Figures also shows network nodes
that do not participate in the consensus quorum for the given
transaction.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we consider a network
with 10 nodes, divided in two clusters A and B. We consider
different cluster configurations, indexed by (ηA, ηB), where ηA
and ηB are the number of nodes in clusters A and B, respec-
tively, with ηA + ηB = 10. Without loss of generality, we fix
cluster A to be the larger one and consider ηA ⊃ {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
The case of ηA = 5 corresponds to identically-sized clusters;
the case of ηA = 10 is ignored as it corresponsds to the
degenerate case of a single cluster. Fast, intra-cluster, links
have a latency between 10 and 30 milliseconds across all
specifications. We consider six values for the average latency
of a slow link, ranging from 50 to 300 milliseconds in 50 ms
increments.
The round trip time (delay) distribution is estimated using a
simulation program written in C and developed in the Visual
Studio software. That is, we simulate communication in a
unstructured peer-to-peer network. The simulator randomly
selects a source and destination from the N nodes in the
quorum, then draws a random route between the source and
the destination. The message delay is computed as a sum of
delays between hops (i.e., intermediary nodes on the route
route). The communication delays between nodes are uniform
random variables in a predefined interval different for fast links
(inter cluster) and slow links (intra cluster).
B. Estimation of delay distribution
Let F` (τ) be the cumulative distribution function of miner
message delay τ , where F` (x) ≡ P (τ ≤ x). The parameter `
is a set of conditioning variables (distance, number of nodes
active, etc.).
We approximate the (theoretical) cumulative distribution
function F (·) with its empirical counterpart obtained through
network simulations, that is
Fˆ` (x) =
Number of observations smaller than x
Number of observations (N)
(14)
where Fˆ` (x) converges to F` (x) if N is arbitrarily large.
For each parameter combination, we set N = 100, 000 (one
hundred thousand simulations).
We estimate the empirical cumulative distribution for the
entire network (F full` (·)) as well as conditional on the source
node being in cluster A or B (FA` (·) and FB` (·), respectively).
Section III-C focuses on network-wide delays, whereas in Sec-
tion III-D we conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to determine
the relative network delays of nodes across clusters.
C. Network-wide results
We estimate the average network delay to consensus us-
ing a standard bootstrap algorithm: from the full sample of
100,000 simulated delays we draw 1,000 sub-samples of 5,000
observations and subsequently average their means. Figure 5
suggests that the average network delay to consensus following
a transaction decreases both (a) in the latency of inter-cluster
links and (b) in the cluster asymmetry level.
The first result is intuitive: the closer the clusters are, geo-
graphically, the faster computers communicate across cluster.
The second result is driven by the fact that, if clusters are more
asymmetric, the route between the source and destination node
is less likely to contain inter-cluster, high-delay hops and more
likely to contain intra-cluster, low-latency hops. As a result,
the average delay is lower in more asymmetric networks.
Interestingly, the variability of the delay decreases in the
level of asymmetry. The result follows immediately from the
higher delay variability of slow links, which are less likely to
be used for consensus in an asymmetric network topology.
Fig. 5: Average message delay (full network)
This figure illustrates the mean message delay in a network with 10 computers.
The cluster structure is on the x-axis, from an equal distribution of five
computers per cluster (5, 5) to the most uneven distribution with nine
computers in a single cluster (9, 1). Different lines correspond to different
delays on low-speed links. Means are bootstrapped via 1,000 draws of 5,000
observations from the original population of 100,000 delays.
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Figure 6 illustrates the density and cumulative distribution
of delays, using the full samples of 100,000 observations per
topology. We note that more symmetric network topology
configurations exhibit “fatter tails,” that is a higher probability
of extreme delays to consensus. The “fat tail” effect is even
more pronounced for relatively slower inter-cluster links, as
variability increases.
D. Large cluster speed advantage
In this section, we consider delays for nodes in clusters A
and B separately. We implement a Monte Carlo experiment to
estimate the relative probability of posting a transaction to the
Blockchain for nodes in either cluster (i.e., pi in Section II), as
a function of (i) the asymmetry and (ii) the distance between
clusters as defined in Section III-A.
As a first step, we estimate 100,000 delays for nodes in each
cluster and estimate the empirical distribution functions of the
delay using equation (14), that is FˆA`,(ηA,ηB) and Fˆ
B
`,(ηA,ηB)
.
Figure 7 displays the probability distributions of delays for
both clusters, for different cluster asymmetry levels and inter-
cluster delays.
We compare the message delay distributions for nodes in A
and B regions, respectively. First off, the distributions perfectly
overlap if there is no asymmetry between clusters – that is,
if each region contains five nodes. The result is natural since
the network topology is symmetrical. As clusters become more
asymmetric, the mean delay decreases for nodes in both A and
B. The intuition is that if clusters are more asymmetric, there
Fig. 6: Probability distribution of message delays
This figure illustrates the empirical (simulated) distribution of the message
delay in a network with 10 computers, for different cluster asymmetry levels
and link speeds. We plot probability densities (left) and cumulative distribution
functions (right) for a inter-cluster delay of 50 ms (top panel) and 300 ms
respectively (bottom panel)
(a) Inter-cluster average delay is 50 ms.
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(b) Inter-cluster average delay is 300 ms.
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are relatively fewer routes between any two nodes that include
inter-cluster links. That is, messages are less likely to travel
back and forth between clusters to reach their destination,
leading to shorter delays on average. At the same time, the
delay for nodes in A becomes more left-skewed. Even if the
average delay for a node in A is not necessarily smaller than
the average delay for a node in B, there is a higher probability
of a very small delay – probability which increases with cluster
asymmetry.
Once the empirical distribution is estimated, the Monte
Carlo algorithm proceeds as follows, for each of nsim = 1, 000
simulations:
1) We draw ndraws = 10, 000 network delays for each node.
That is, for each draw we take ηA values from FˆA`,(ηA,ηB)
and ηB values from FˆB`,(ηA,ηB).
2) We compute the minimum over the ηA and ηB delays,
and label it as A or B, depending on its originating
cluster.
3) We compute the probability of cluster A having the
smaller delay in a particular simulation, as:
pˆA,k =
# times smallest delay ∈ A
ndraws
, (15)
Fig. 7: Probability distribution of message delays in each
cluster
This figure illustrates the empirical (simulated) distribution of the message
delay in a network with 10 computers, for each cluster A and B. The inter-
cluster delay is fixed to 300 ms. The top (bottom) panel displays probability
distribution functions for low (high) asymmetry levels.
(a) Asymmetry levels are: left (5,5) and right (6,4)
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(b) Asymmetry levels are: left (8,2) and right (9,1)
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where k runs over simulations.
4) We average the estimated probabilities pˆA,k over the
nsim = 1, 000 simulations
pˆclusterA =
∑
k pˆA,k
nsim
. (16)
Figure 8 illustrates the Monte Carlo results at cluster level.
Nodes in the larger cluster (i.e., cluster A) are on aggregate
more likely to have the smallest message delay and “win” the
transaction if either the cluster size asymmetry is larger or
clusters are further apart geographically.
However, since the study is focused on individual nodes’
incentives to join a particular blockchain, we need to estimate
the probability of an individual node in a given cluster having
the smallest delay, that is pˆnodej with j ∈ {A,B}. Since nodes
in each group are independent, we estimate the individual
probabilities as
pˆnodeA =
pˆclusterA
ηA
and pˆnodeB =
1− pˆclusterA
ηB
. (17)
Figure 9 shows that as cluster asymmetry increases, each
node is eventually less likely to arrive first. Even if nodes
in cluster A are on aggregate favored by the asymmetry, the
Fig. 8: Probability of smallest delay (cluster level)
This figure illustrates the probability, at the cluster level, that any node in the
given cluster has the smallest delay to post a transaction on the Blockchain.
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probability of any node in cluster A “winning” increases at a
slower rate than the number of nodes. We obtain a concave
relationship between pˆnodeA and cluster asymmetry: pˆ
node
A first
increases, then deceases in the level of asymmetry. For nodes
in cluster B, higher asymmetry unambiguously decreases the
probability of having the smallest delay.
Fig. 9: Probability of smallest delay (individual node)
This figure illustrates the probability, at the cluster level, that a particular
node in the given cluster has the smallest delay to post a transaction on the
Blockchain.
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Figure 10 illustrates the relative advantage of a node in
cluster A – that is, a measure of pi from Section II. The
relative advantage increases with both cluster distance and
cluster asymmetry. Moreover, the two effects reinforce each
other: asymmetry favors the larger cluster more when the
distance between clusters increases. At its peak (for an inter-
cluster delay of 200 ms and a single computer out of ten in
cluster B), a node in cluster A is 30 times more likely to have
the shortest messaging delay and win the transaction.
Formally, we estimate a linear regression model to capture
the relationship between winning probabilities and cluster
Fig. 10: Winning likelihood ratio
This figure illustrates the ratio between the probability of smallest delay for
a node in cluster A and a node in cluster B, respectively.
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TABLE II: Determinants of “local” speed advantage
Dependent variable (y)
pˆclusterA pˆ
node
A pˆ
node
B
pˆnodeA
pˆnodeB
Constant (β0) 77.96*** 11.06*** 5.87*** 7.19***
(41.02) (98.75) (22.30) (8.53)
Inter-cluster delay (β1) 1.41 0.19* -0.72*** 4.84***
(0.76) (1.79) (-2.75) (4.50)
Cluster asymmetry (β2) 14.68*** 0.11 -2.90*** 10.23***
(9.44) (1.187) (-11.54) (10.31)
Delay × asymmetry (β3) 0.27 0.02 -0.50 8.73***
(0.16) (0.15) (-1.51) (6.37)
Model R2 66% 11% 81% 90%
Asymptotic norrmal z-statistics in parentheses.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
A higher R2 indicates the model explains more of the data variation.
characteristics:
y = β0 + β1Delay + β2
ηA
ηB
+ β3Delay× ηA
ηB
+ error, (18)
where the dependent variable y can take four values,
y ∈
{
pˆclusterA , pˆ
node
A , pˆ
node
B ,
pˆnodeA
pˆnodeB
}
,
Delay stands in for the inter-cluster delay and
ηA
ηB
is a measure
of cluster asymmetry (standardized in the regression to have
zero mean and unit standard deviation). Table II presents the
results of the regression. In particular, the speed advantage of
the large cluster (the ratio
pˆnodeA
pˆnodeB
in the last column) increases
in both the inter-cluster delay and cluster asymmetry. There is
a positive and significant interaction effect between the two.
The effects are primarily driven from a sharp decrease in the
winning probability of nodes in B (third column) rather than
an increase in the winning probability of nodes in A (second
column).
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the limits of distributed exchange (DEX)
infrastructure. One potential advantage of a DEX is to provide
a unique marketplace for buyers and sellers and maximize
network effects, while at the same time eliminating concerns
related to the exchange operator’s market power. Can such
a distributed exchange operate over geographically distant
regions (e.g., different cities or countries where securities are
cross-listed)? To answer the question, we both build an eco-
nomic model of DEX and conduct Monte Carlo simultations
of unstructured P2P networks.
We find that asymmetry between economic activity levels
generates a value transfer from trading infrastructure providers
in high-activity regions to providers in low-activity regions.
Consequently, miners in high-activity regions only have in-
centives to join a distributed exchange when then benefit
from a significant processing speed advantage over the peer-
to-peer network. Through P2P network simulations, we find
that the speed advantage increases in the level of computer
infrastructure asymmetry across regions.
We conclude that cross-region DEX may be feasible if
the asymmetry levels in computer infrastructure and trading
interest across regions are correlated, which is a natural
assumption since both are driven by economic activity, which
tends to be clustered geographically. Our results are relevant
for exchange operators, FinTech enterpreneurs, and financial
regulators.
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APPENDIX
Model parameters and interpretation
Parameter Definition
N Number of miners in each cluster, A and B.
β ≥ 12 Fraction of trades originating in cluster A.
f Exogenous mining fee.
pi ≤ 1 Likelihood ratio: P (long-distance miner wins )
P (local miner wins)
∆ Efficiency gains from a single DEX.
θ Inter-cluster network latency.
Simulation variables and interpretation.
Variable Definition
ηi Number of nodes in cluster i, i ∈ {A,B}
F full` (τ) Network-wide distribution of message delays
F
i∈{A,B}
` (·) Cluster-specific distribution of message delays
pˆclusteri∈{A,B} Probability that winning node is in cluster i.
pˆnodei∈{A,B} Win probability for a given node in cluster i.
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